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Abstract
We discuss a crowd-based theory for describing the collective behavior in a generic multi-agent
population which is competing for a limited resource. These systems – whose binary versions
we refer to as B-A-R (Binary Agent Resource) collectives – have a dynamical evolution which is
determined by the aggregate action of the heterogeneous, adaptive agent population. Accounting
for the strong correlations between agents’ strategies, yields an accurate description of the system’s
dynamics in terms of a ‘Crowd-Anticrowd’ theory. This theory can incorporate the effects of an
underlying network within the population. Most importantly, its applicability is not just limited
to the El Farol Problem and the Minority Game. Indeed, the Crowd-Anticrowd theory offers a
powerful approach to tackling the dynamical behavior of a wide class of agent-based Complex
Systems, across a range of disciplines. With this in mind, the present working paper is written for
a general multi-disciplinary audience within the Complex Systems community.
Working paper for the Workshop on Collectives and the Design of Complex Systems,
Stanford University, August 2003.
∗ Research performed in collaboration with former graduate students Michael Hart and Paul Jef-
feries, and present graduate students Sehyo Charley Choe, Sean Gourley and David Smith.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Complex Systems – together with their dynamical behavior known as Complexity – are
thought to pervade much of the natural, informational, sociological, and economic world
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. A unique, all-encompassing definition of a Complex System is lacking -
worse still, such a definition would probably end up being too vague. Instead, such Com-
plex Systems are better thought of in terms of a list of common features which distinguish
them from ‘simple’ systems, and from systems which are just ‘complicated’ as opposed
to being complex. Although a unique list of Complex System properties does not exist,
most people would agree that the following would typically appear: feedback and adap-
tation at the macroscopic and/or microscopic level, many (but not too many) interacting
parts, non-stationarity, evolution, coupling with the environment, and observed dynamics
which depend upon the particular realization of the system. In addition, Complex Systems
have the ability to produce large macroscopic changes which appear spontaneously but have
long-lasting consequences. Such large changes might also be referred to as ‘innovations’,
‘breakthroughs’, ‘gateway events’ or ‘punctuated equilibria’ depending on the context [6].
Alternatively, the particular trajectory taken by a Complex System can be thought of as
exhibiting ‘frozen accidents’ [6]. Understanding the functionality of Complex Systems is of
paramount importance, from both practical and theoretical viewpoints. Such functionality
is currently being addressed through the study of ‘Collectives’ [7].
The down-side of labelling such a wide range of systems as belonging to the same ‘Com-
plex’ family, is that instead of saying something about everything, one may end up saying
nothing very much about anything. Indeed, one may end up with little more than the vague
notion that ‘ant colonies are like vehicular traffic, which is like financial markets, which are
like fungal colonies etc.’. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to focus too narrowly
on a specific example of a Complex System since the lessons learned may not be transfer-
able - worse still, they may be misleading or plain wrong in the context of other Complex
Systems. Such is the daunting task facing researchers in Complex Systems: based on stud-
ies of a few very specific Complex System models, how can one extract general theoretical
principles which have wide applicability across a range of disciplines? This explains why, to
date, there are very few truly universal theoretical principles or ‘laws’ to describe Complex
Systems.
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As pointed out by John Casti on p. 213 of Ref. [1], ‘.... a decent mathematical formal-
ism to describe and analyze the [so-called] El Farol Problem would go a long way toward
the creation of a viable theory of complex, adaptive systems’. The rationale behind this
statement is that the El Farol Problem, which was originally proposed by Brian Arthur[8] to
demonstrate the essence of Complexity in financial markets, incorporates the key features of
a Complex System in an everyday setting. Very briefly, the El Farol Problem concerns the
collective decision-making of a group of potential bar-goers, who repeatedly try to predict
whether they should attend a potentially overcrowded bar on a given night each week. They
have no information about the others predictions. Indeed the only information available to
each agent is global, comprising a string of outcomes (‘overcrowded’ or ‘undercrowded’) for
a limited number of previous occasions. Hence they end up having to predict the predictions
of others. No ‘typical’ agent exists, since all such typical agents would then make the same
decision, hence rendering their common prediction scheme useless. This simple yet intrigu-
ing problem has inspired a huge amount of interest in the physics community over the past
few years. Reference [9], which was the first work on the full El Farol Problem in the physics
community, identified a minimum in the volatility of attendance at the bar with increasing
adaptivity of the agents. With the exception of Ref. [9], the physics literature has instead
focussed on a simplified binary form of the El Farol Problem as introduced by Challet and
Zhang [10]. This so-called Minority Game (MG) is discussed in detail in Refs. [11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38])
and Ref. [39]. The Minority Game concerns a population of N heterogeneous agents with
limited capabilities and information, who repeatedly compete to be in the minority group.
The agents (e.g. people, cells, data-packets) are adaptive, but only have access to global in-
formation about the game’s progress. In both the El Farol Problem and the Minority Game,
the time-averaged fluctuations in the system’s global output are of particular importance –
for example, the time-averaged fluctuations in attendance can be used to assess the wastage
of the underlying global resource (i.e. bar seating).
Despite its appeal, the El Farol Problem (and the Minority Game in particular) is some-
what limited in its applicability to general Complex Systems, and hence arguably falls short
of representing a true generic paradigm for Complex Systems. First, the reward structure
is simultaneously too restrictive and specific. Agents in the Minority Game, for example,
can only win if they instantaneously choose the minority group at a particular timestep:
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yet this is not what investors in a financial market, for example, would call ‘winning’ [40].
Second, agents only have access to global information. In the natural world, most if not all
biological and social systems have at least some degree of underlying connectivity between
the agents, allowing for local exchange of information or physical goods [41]. In fact it is
this interplay of network structure, agent heterogeneity, and the resulting functionality of
the overall system, which is likely to be of prime interest across disciplines in the Complex
Systems field.
Three enormous challenges therefore face any candidate Complex Systems theory: it
must be able to explain the specific numerical results observed for the El Farol Problem and
its variants; it should also be able to account for the presence of an arbitrary underlying
network; yet it should be directly applicable to a much wider class of ‘game’ with a variety of
reward structures. Only then will one have a hope of claiming some form of generic theory of
Complex Systems. And only then will the design of multi-agent Collectives to address both
forward and inverse problems, become relatively straightforward. It might then be possible
to achieve the Holy Grail of predicting a priori how to engineer agents’ reward structures, or
which specific game rules to invoke, or what network communication scheme to introduce,
in order to achieve some global objective. For a detailed discussion of these issues, we refer
to the paper of Kagan Tumer and David Wolpert [7] at this Workshop.
In this paper, we attempt to take a step in this more general direction, by building on
the success of the Crowd-Anticrowd theory in describing both the original El Farol Problem
[9], and the Minority Game [23, 24] and its variants. In particular, we present a formal
treatment of the collective behavior of a generic multi-agent population which is competing
for a limited resource. The applicability of the Crowd-Anticrowd analysis is not limited
to MG-like games, even though we focus on MG-like games in order to demonstrate the
accuracy of the Crowd-Anticrowd approach in explaining the numerical results. We also
show how the Crowd-Anticrowd theory can be extended to incorporate the presence of
networks. The theory is built around the crowding (i.e. correlations) in strategy-space,
rather than the precise rules of the game itself, and only makes fairly modest assumptions
about a game’s dynamical behavior. To the extent that a given Complex System mimics a
general competitive multi-agent game, it is likely that the Crowd-Anticrowd approach will
therefore be applicable. This would be a welcome development, given the lack of general
theoretical concepts in the field of Complex Systems as a whole. The challenge then moves to
4
understanding how best to embed the present theory within the powerful COIN framework
developed by Wolpert and Tumer for Collectives [7].
We have tried to aim this paper at a multi-disciplinary audience within the general Com-
plex Systems community. The layout of the paper is as follows. Section II briefly discusses
the background to the Crowd-Anticrowd framework. Section III provides a description of a
wide class of Complex Systems which will be our focus: we call these B-A-R (Binary Agent
Resource) problems in recognition of the stimulus provided by Arthur’s El Farol Problem.
The Minority Game is a special limiting case of such B-A-R problems. Section IV develops
the Crowd-Anticrowd formalism which describes a general B-A-R system’s dynamics. Sec-
tion V considers the implementation of the Crowd-Anticrowd formalism, deriving analytic
expressions for the global fluctuations in the system in various limiting cases. Section VI
applies these results to both the basic Minority Game and several generalizations, in the ab-
sence of a network. Section VII then considers the intriguing case of B-A-R systems subject
to an underlying network. In particular, it is shown analytically that such network structure
may have important benefits at very low values of network connectivity, in terms of reduced
wastage of global resources. The conclusion is given in Section VIII.
II. CROWD-ANTICROWD FRAMEWORK
The fundamental idea behind our crowd-based approach describing the dynamics of a
complex multi-agent system, is to incorporate accurately the correlations in strategies fol-
lowed by the agents. This methodology is well-known in the field of many-body theory
in physics, particularly in condensed matter physics where composite ‘super-particles’ are
typically considered which incorporate all the strong correlations in the system. A well-
known example is an exciton gas: each exciton contains one negatively-charged electron and
one positively-charged hole. Because of their opposite charges, these two particles move
in opposite directions in a given electric field and attract each other strongly. However
since this exciton super-particle is neutral overall, any two excitons will have a negligi-
ble interaction and hence the excitons move independently of each other. More generally,
a given exciton (or so-called ‘excitonic complex’) may contain a ‘crowd’ of ne ≥ 1 elec-
trons, together with a ‘crowd’ of nh ≥ 1 holes having opposite behavior. In an analogous
way, the Crowd-Anticrowd theory in multi-agent games forms groups containing like-minded
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agents (‘Crowd’) and opposite-minded agents (‘Anticrowd’). This is done in such a way that
the strong strategy correlations are confined within each group, leaving weakly interacting
Crowd-Anticrowd groups which then behave in an uncorrelated way with respect to each
other. The first application[9] of our crowd-based approach was to the full El Farol Prob-
lem. It yielded good quantitative agreement with the numerical simulations. However the
analysis was complicated by the fact that the space of strategies in the El Farol Problem is
difficult to quantify. This analysis becomes far easier if the system has an underlying binary
structure, as we will see in Sections III and IV. However we note that the Crowd-Anticrowd
analysis is not in principle limited to such binary systems.
As indicated above, the Crowd-Anticrowd analysis breaks the N -agent population down
into groups of agents, according to the correlations between these agents’ strategies. Each
group G contains a crowd of agents using strategies which are positively-correlated, and a
complementary anticrowd using strategies which are strongly negatively-correlated to the
crowd. Hence a given group G might contain nR[t] agents who are all using strategy R and
hence act as a crowd (e.g. by attending the bar en masse in the El Farol Problem) together
with nR[t] agents who are all using the opposite strategy R and hence act as an anticrowd
(e.g. by staying away from the bar en masse). Most importantly, the anticrowd nR[t] will
always take the opposite decisions to the crowd nR[t] regardless of the current circumstances
in the game, since the strategies R and R imply the opposite action in all situations. Note
that this collective action may be entirely involuntary in the sense that typical games will be
competitive, and there may be very limited (if any) communication between agents. Since all
the strong correlations have been accounted for within each group, these individual groups
{G} = G1, G2, . . . , Gn will then act in an uncorrelated way with respect to each other, and
hence can be treated as n uncorrelated stochastic processes. The global dynamics of the
system is then given by the sum of the n uncorrelated stochastic processes generated by the
groups {G} = G1, G2, . . . , Gn.
Regarding the special limiting case of the Minority Game (MG), we note that there have
been various alternative theories proposed to describe the MG’s dynamics [12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
18, 34, 35, 37, 38]. Although elegant and sophisticated, such theories have however not been
able to reproduce the original numerical results of Ref. [20] over the full range of parameter
space. What is missing from such theories is an accurate description of the correlations
between agents’ strategies: in essence, these correlations produce a highly-correlated form
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of decision noise which cannot easily be averaged over or added in. By contrast these strong
correlations take center-stage in the Crowd-Anticrowd theory, in a similar way to particle-
particle correlations taking center-stage in many-body physics.
III. B-A-R (BINARY AGENT RESOURCE) SYSTEMS
A. Generic B-A-R system setup
Figure 1 summarizes the generic form of the B-A-R (Binary Agent Resource) system
under consideration. At timestep t, each agent (e.g. a bar customer, a commuter, or a
market agent) decides whether to enter a game where the choices are action +1 (e.g. attend
the bar, take route A, or buy) and action −1 (e.g. go home, take route B, or sell). We
will denote the number of agents choosing −1 as n−1[t], and the number choosing +1 as
n+1[t]. For simplicity, we will assume here that all the agents participate in the game at each
timestep, although this is not a necessary restriction. We can define an ‘excess demand’ as
D[t] = n+1[t]− n−1[t] . (1)
As suggested in Figure 1, the agents may have connections between them: these connections
may be temporary or permanent, and their functionality may be conditional on some other
features in the problem. The global information available to the agents is a common memory
of the recent history, i.e. the most recent m global outcomes. For example for m = 2, the
possible forms are . . . 00, . . . 01, . . . 10 or . . . 11 which we denote simply as 00, 01, 10 or 11.
Hence at each timestep, the recent history constitutes a particular bit-string of lengthm. For
general m, there will be P = 2m possible history bit-strings. These history bit-strings can
alternatively be represented in decimal form: µ = {0, 1, ..., P − 1} where µ = 0 corresponds
to 00, µ = 1 corresponds to 01 etc. A strategy consists of a predicted action, −1 or +1,
for each possible history bit-string. Hence there are 2P possible strategies. For m = 2 for
example, there are therefore 16 possible strategies. In order to mimic the heterogeneity in
the system, a typical game setup would have each agent randomly picking S strategies at
the outset of the game. In the Minority Game, these strategies are then fixed for all time –
however a more general setup would allow the strategies held, and hence the heterogeneity
in the population, to change with time. The agents then update the scores of their strategies
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after each timestep with +1 (or −1) as the pay-off for predicting the action which won (or
lost). This binary representation of histories and strategies is due to Challet and Zhang [11].
B. Rules of the Game
The rules of the game determine the subsequent game dynamics. The particular rules
chosen will depend on the practical system under consideration. It is an open question
as to how best to abstract an appropriate ‘game’ from a real-world Complex System. In
Ref. [40], we discuss multi-agent games which are relevant to financial markets. Elsewhere
we plan to discuss possible choices of game for the specific case of foraging fungal colonies
[42]. The foraging mechanism adopted within such networks might well be active in other
biological systems, and may also prove relevant to social/economic networks. Insight into
network functionality may even prove useful in designing and controlling arrays of imperfect
nanostructures, microchips, nano-bio components, and other ‘systems on a chip’ [43].
The following rules need to be specified in order to fully define the dynamics of a multi-
agent game:
• How is the global outcome, and hence the winning action, to be decided at each
timestep t? In a general game, the global outcome may be an arbitrary function of
the values of n−1[t
′ ≤ t], n+1[t′ ≤ t], and L[t′ ≤ t] for any t′. Consider the specific case
of the El Farol Problem: we can define the action +1 (−1) to be attend (stay away)
with L[t] representing the bar capacity. If n+1[t] < L[t], the bar will be undercrowded
and hence can be assigned the global outcome 0. Hence the winning action is +1 (i.e.
attend). Likewise if n+1[t] > L[t], the bar will be overcrowded and can be assigned the
global outcome 1. The winning action is then −1 (i.e. stay away). However more gen-
erally, the global outcome and hence winning action may be any function of present or
past system data. Furthermore, the resource level L[t] may be endogenously produced
(e.g. a specific function of past values of n−1[t], n+1[t]) or exogenously produced (e.g.
determined by external environmental concerns). Figure 1 denotes the global outcome
(and hence winning action) algorithm as lying in the hands of a ficticious ‘Game-
master’, who aggregates the information in the game such as n+1[t], n−1[t] and L[t],
and then announces the global outcome. We note that in principle, the agents them-
selves do not actually need to know what game they are playing. Instead they are just
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fed with the global outcome: each of their S strategies are then rewarded/penalized
according to whether the strategy predicted the winning/losing action. One typical
setup has agents adding/deducting one virtual point from strategies that would have
suggested the winning/losing action.
• How do agents decide which strategy to use? Typically one might expect agents to
play their highest scoring strategy, as in the original El Farol Problem and Minority
Game. However agents may instead adopt a stochastic method for choosing which
strategy to use at each timestep. There may even be ‘dumb’ agents, who use their
worst strategy at each timestep. Of course, it is not obvious that such agents would
then necessarily lose, i.e. whether such a method is actually dumb will depend on the
decisions of the other agents.
• What happens in a strategy tie-break situation? Suppose agents are programmed to
always use their highest-scoring strategy. If an agent were then to hold two or more
strategies that are tied for the position of highest-scoring strategy, then a rule must
be invoked for breaking this tie. One example would be for the agent to toss a fair
coin in order to decide which of his tied strategies to use at that turn of the game.
Alternatively, an agent may prefer to stick with the strategy which was higher on the
previous timestep.
• What are the rules governing the connections between agents? In terms of structure,
the connections may be hard-wired or temporary, random or ordered or partially
ordered (e.g. scale-free network or small-world network). In terms of functionality,
there is also an endless set of possible choices of rules. For example, any two connected
agents might compare the scores of their highest scoring strategies, and hence adopt
the predicted action of whichever strategy is overall the highest-scoring. Just as above,
a tie-break rule will then have to be imposed for the case where two connected agents
have equal-scoring highest strategies – for example a coin-toss might be invoked, or a
‘selfish’ rule may be used whereby an agent sticks with his own strategy in the event
of such a tie. The connections themselves may have directionality, e.g. perhaps agent
b can influence agent d but not vice-versa. Or maybe the connection (e.g. between b
and a) is inactive unless a certain criterion is met. Hence it may turn out that agent
b follows d even though agent d is actually following agent a.
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• Do agents have to play at each timestep? For simplicity in the present paper, we
will consider that this is the case. This rule is easily generalized by introducing a
confidence level: if the agent doesn’t hold any strategies with sufficiently high success
rate, then the agent does not participate at that timestep. This in turn implies that
the number of agents participating at each timestep fluctuates. We do not pursue this
generalization here, but note that its effect is to systematically prevent the playing
of low-scoring strategies which are anticorrelated to the high-scoring strategies. For
financial markets, for example, this extra property of confidence-level is a crucial
ingredient for building a realistic market model, since it leads to fluctuations in the
‘volume’ of active agents [32, 40].
We emphasize that the set-up in Figure 1 does not make any assumptions about the actual
game being played, nor how the winning decision is to be decided. Instead, one hopes to
obtain a fairly general description of the type of dynamics which are possible without having
to specify the exact details of the game. On the other hand, situations can arise where the
precise details of the strategy tie-break mechanism, for example, have a fundamental impact
on the type of dynamics exhibited by the system and hence its overall performance in terms
of achieving some particular goal. We refer to Ref. [44] for an explicit example of this, for
the case of network-based multi-agent systems.
C. Strategy Space
Figure 2 shows in more detail them = 2 example strategy space from Figure 1. A strategy
is a set of instructions to describe what an agent should do in any given situation, i.e. given
any particular history µ, the strategy then decides what action the agent should take. The
strategy space is the set of strategies from which agents are allocated their strategies. If this
strategy allocation is fixed randomly at the outset, then this acts as a source of quenched
disorder. Alternatively, the strategy allocation may be allowed to evolve in response to the
system’s dynamics. In the case that the initial strategy allocation is fixed, it is clear that the
agents playing the game are limited, and hence may become ‘frustrated’, by this quenched
disorder. The strategy space shown is known as the Full Strategy Space FSS, and contains
all possible permutations of the actions −1 and +1 for each history. As such there are 22m
strategies in this space. The 2m dimensional hypercube shows all 22
m
strategies from the
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FSS at its vertices. Of course, there are many additional strategies that could be thought of,
but which aren’t present within the FSS. For example, the simple strategies of persistence
and anti-persistence are not present in the FSS. The advantage however of using the FSS is
that the strategies form a complete set, and as such the FSS displays no bias towards any
particular action for a given history. To include any additional strategies like persistence and
anti-persistence would mean opening up the strategy space, hence losing the simplicity of
the B-A-R structure and returning to the complexity of Arthur’s original El Farol Problem
[8, 9].
It can be observed from the FSS, that one can choose a subset of strategies [11] such that
any pair within this subset has one of the following characteristics:
• anti-correlated, e.g. −1−1−1−1 and +1+1+1+1, or −1−1+1+1 and +1+1−1−1.
For example, any two agents using the (m = 2) strategies −1−1+1+1 and +1+1−1−1
respectively, would take the opposite action irrespective of the sequence of previous
outcomes and hence the history. Hence one agent will always do the opposite of the
other agent. For example, if one agent chooses +1 at a given timestep, the other agent
will choose −1. Their net effect on the demand D[t] therefore cancels out at each
timestep, regardless of the history. Hence they will not contribute to fluctuations in
D[t].
• uncorrelated, e.g. −1 − 1 − 1 − 1 and −1 − 1 + 1 + 1. For example, any two agents
using the strategies −1 − 1 − 1 − 1 and −1 − 1 + 1 + 1 respectively, would take the
opposite action for two of the four histories, while they would take the same action
for the remaining two histories. If the m = 2 histories occur equally often, the actions
of the two agents will be uncorrelated on average.
A convenient measure of the distance (i.e. closeness) of any two strategies is the Hamming
distance which is defined as the number of bits that need to be changed in going from one
strategy to another. For example, the Hamming distance between −1 − 1 − 1 − 1 and
+1+1+1+ 1 is 4, while the Hamming distance between −1− 1− 1− 1 and −1− 1+ 1+ 1
is just 2. Although there are 2P ≡ 22m=2 ≡ 16 strategies in the m = 2 strategy space, it can
be seen that one can choose subsets such that any strategy-pair within this subset is either
anti-correlated or uncorrelated. Consider, for example, the two groups
Um=2 ≡ {−1− 1− 1− 1, +1 + 1− 1− 1, +1− 1 + 1− 1, −1 + 1 + 1− 1} (2)
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and
Um=2 ≡ {+1 + 1 + 1 + 1, −1− 1 + 1 + 1, −1 + 1− 1 + 1, +1− 1− 1 + 1}. (3)
Any two strategies within Um=2 are uncorrelated since they have a Hamming distance of
2. Likewise any two strategies within Um=2 are uncorrelated since they have a relative
Hamming distance of 2. However, each strategy in Um=2 has an anti-correlated strategy in
Um=2: for example, −1 − 1 − 1 − 1 is anti-correlated to +1 + 1 + 1 + 1, +1 + 1 − 1 − 1 is
anti-correlated to −1− 1 + 1 + 1 etc. This subset of strategies comprising Um=2 and Um=2,
forms a Reduced Strategy Space (RSS) [11]. Since it contains the essential correlations of
the Full Strategy Space (FSS), running a given game simulation within the RSS is likely to
reproduce the main features obtained using the FSS [11]. The RSS has a smaller number
of strategies 2.2m = 2P ≡ 2m+1 than the FSS which has 2P = 22m . For m = 2, there are
8 strategies in the RSS compared to 16 in the FSS, whilst for m = 8 there are 1.16 × 1077
strategies in the FSS but only 512 strategies in the RSS. We note that the choice of the
RSS is not unique, i.e. within a given FSS there are many possible choices for a RSS. In
particular, it is possible to create 22
m
/2m+1 distinct reduced strategy spaces from the FSS.
In short, the RSS provides a minimal set of strategies which ‘span’ the FSS and are hence
representative of its full structure.
D. History Space
The history µ of recent outcomes changes in time, i.e. it is a dynamical variable. The
history dynamics can be represented on a directed graph (a so-called digraph). The partic-
ular form of directed graph is called a de Bruijn graph. Figure 3 shows some examples of
the de Bruijn graph for m = 1, 2, and 3. The probability that the outcome at time t + 1
will be a 1 (or 0) depends on the state at time t. Hence it will depend on the previous m
outcomes, i.e. it depends on the particular state of the history bit-string. The dependence
on earlier timesteps means that the game is not Markovian. However, modifying the game
such that there is a finite time-horizon for scoring strategies, may then allow the resulting
game to be viewed as a high-dimensional Markov process (see Refs. [29, 30] for the case of
the Minority Game).
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E. Heterogeneity in strategy allocation, and initial conditions
The dynamics for a particular run of the B-A-R system will depend upon the strategies
that the agents hold, and the random process used to decide tie-breaks. The particular
dynamics which emerge also depend upon the initial score-vector of the strategies and the
initial history used to seed the start of the game. If the initial strategy score-vector is not
‘typical’, then a bias can be introduced into the game which never disappears. In short, the
system never recovers from this bias. It will be assumed that no such initial bias exists. In
practice this is achieved, for example, by setting all the initial scores to zero. The initial
choice of history is not considered to be an important effect. It is assumed that any transient
effects resulting from the particular history seed will have disappeared, i.e. the initial history
seed does not introduce any long-term bias.
The strategy allocation among agents can be described in terms of a tensor Ω [31]. This
tensor Ω describes the distribution of strategies among the N individual agents. If this
strategy allocation is fixed from the beginning of the game, then it acts as a quenched
disorder in the system. The rank of the tensor Ω is given by the number of strategies S
that each agent holds. For example, for S = 3 the element Ωi,j,k gives the number of agents
assigned strategy i, then strategy j, and then strategy k, in that order. Hence
X∑
i,j,k,...
Ωi,j,k,... = N, (4)
where the value of X represents the number of distinct strategies that exist within the
strategy space chosen: X = 22
m
in the FSS, and X = 2.2m in the RSS. Figure 4 shows
an example distribution Ω for N = 101 agents in the case of m = 2 and S = 2, in the
reduced strategy space RSS. We note that a single Ω ‘macrostate’ corresponds to many
possible ‘microstates’ describing the specific partitions of strategies among the agents. For
example, consider an N = 2 agent system with S = 1: the microstate (R,R′) in which
agent 1 has strategy R while agent 2 has strategy R′, belongs to the same macrostate Ω as
(R′, R) in which agent 1 has strategy R′ while agent 2 has strategy R. Hence the present
Crowd-Anticrowd theory retained at the level of a given Ω, describes the set of all games
which belong to that same Ω macrostate. We also note that although Ω is not symmetric,
it can be made so since the agents will typically not distinguish between the order in which
the two strategies are picked. Given this, we will henceforth focus on S = 2 and consider the
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symmetrized version of the strategy allocation matrix given by Ψ = 1
2
(Ω + ΩT ). In general,
Ψ would be allowed to change in time, possibly evolving under some pre-defined selection
criteria. In David Smith’s paper elsewhere in this Workshop, changes in Ψ are invoked in
order to control the future evolution of the multi-agent game: this corresponds to a change
in heterogeneity in the agent population, and could represent the physical situation where
individual agents (e.g. robots) could be re-wired, re-programmed, or replaced in order to
invoke a change in the system’s future evolution, or to avoid certain future scenarios or
trajectories for the system as a whole.
F. Design Criteria for Collective
In addition to the excess demand D[t] in such B-A-R systems, one is typically also inter-
ested in higher order-moments of this quantity – for example, the standard deviation of D[t]
(or ‘volatility’ in a financial context). This gives a measure of the fluctuations in the system,
and hence can be used as a measure of ‘risk’ in the system. In particular the standard devi-
ation gives an idea of the size of typical fluctuations in the system. However in the case that
D[t] has a power-law distribution, the standard deviation may be a misleading representation
of such risk because of the ‘heavy tails’ associated with the power-law [40]. Practical risk is
arguably better associated with the probability of the system hitting a certain critical value
(Dcrit), in a similar way to the methodology of financial Value-at-Risk [40]. However a note
of caution is worthwhile: if there are high-order correlations in the system and hence in the
time-series D[t] itself, any risk assessment based on Probability Distribution Functions over
a fixed time-scale (e.g. single timestep) may be misleading. Instead, it may be the cumula-
tive effects of a string of large negative values of D[t] which constitute the true risk, since
these may take the system into dangerous territory. The possibility of designing a Collective
in order to build in some form of immunization/resistance to such large cumulative changes
or endogenous ‘extreme events’, or alternatively the possibility of performing ‘on-line’ soft
control in an evolving system, is a fascinating topic. We again refer to the paper of David
Smith elsewhere in this Workshop for a detailed discussion of these topics. For simplicity,
we will focus here on developing a description of D[t] and its standard deviation, noting that
the same analytic approach would work equally well for other statistical functions of D[t].
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IV. CROWD-ANTICROWD FORMALISM
Here we focus on developing a description of D[t] and its standard deviation. Similar
analysis can be carried out for any function of D[t]. For example, the function f [D[t]] ≡
[D[t]−〈D[t]〉]α with α > 2, places more weighting on large deviations of D[t] from the mean.
Alternatively, one may consider a function of past values {D[t′ < t]}, such as the cumulative
value P [t] =
∑
iD[ti < t], or any function of the constituent processes n+1[t] and n−1[t].
Consider an arbitrary timestep t during a run of the game, at which the particular real-
ization of the strategy allocation matrix is given by Ψ. We will assume that Ψ is effectively
constant over the time-window during which we will calculate the statistical properties of
D[t]. There is a current score-vector S[t] and a current history µ[t] which define the state
of the game. The excess demand D[t] = D [S[t], µ[t]] is given by Equation 1. The standard
deviation of D[t] for this given run, corresponds to a time-average for a given realization
of Ψ and a given set of initial conditions. It may turn out that we are only interested in
ensemble-averaged quantities: consequently the standard deviation will then need to be av-
eraged over many runs, and hence averaged over all realizations of Ψ and all sets of initial
conditions.
Equation 1 can be rewritten by summing over the RSS as follows:
D [S[t], µ[t]] = n+1[t]− n−1[t] ≡
2P∑
R=1
a
µ[t]
R n
S[t]
R , (5)
where P = 2m. The quantity a
µ[t]
R = ±1 is the response of strategy R to the history bit-string
µ at time t. The quantity n
S[t]
R is the number of agents using strategy R at time t. The
superscript S[t] is a reminder that this number of agents will depend on the strategy score
at time t. The calculation of the average demand D[t] will now be shown, where the average
is over time for a given realization of the strategy allocation Ψ. We use the notation 〈X [t]〉t
to denote a time-average over the variable X [t] for a given Ψ. Hence
〈D [S[t], µ[t]]〉t =
2P∑
R=1
〈
a
µ[t]
R n
S[t]
R
〉
t
(6)
=
2P∑
R=1
〈
a
µ[t]
R
〉
t
〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
where we have used the property that a
µ[t]
R and n
S[t]
R are uncorrelated. We now consider the
special case in which all histories are visited equally on average: this may arise as the result
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of a periodic cycling through the history space (e.g. a Eulerian trail around the de Bruijn
graph) or if the histories are visited randomly. Even if this situation does not hold for a
specific Ψ, it may indeed hold once the averaging over Ψ has also been taken. For example,
in the Minority Game all histories are visited equally at small m and a given Ψ: however
the same is only true for large m if we take the additional average over all Ψ. Under the
property of equal histories, we can write
〈D [S[t], µ[t]]〉t =
2P∑
R=1

 1
P
P−1∑
µ=0
a
µ[t]
R

〈nS[t]R 〉t (7)
=
P∑
R=1

 1
P
P−1∑
µ=0
a
µ[t]
R + a
µ[t]
R

〈nS[t]R 〉t
=
P∑
R=1
0.
〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
= 0
where we have used the exact result that a
µ[t]
R = −aµ[t]R for all µ[t], and the approximation〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
=
〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
. This approximation is reasonable for a competitive game since there is
typically no a priori best strategy, hence each strategy has its own ‘five minutes of glory’:
if the strategies are distributed fairly evenly among the agents, this then implies that the
average number playing each strategy is approximately equal and hence
〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
=
〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
.
In the event that all histories are not equally visited over time, even after averaging over
all Ψ, it may still happen that the system’s dynamics is restricted to equal visits to some
subset of histories. An example of this would arise for m = 3, for example, for a repetitive
sequence of outcomes . . . 00110011001 in which case the system repeatedly performs the
4-cycle . . . → 001 → 011 → 110 → 100 → 001 → . . .. In this case one can then carry
out the averaging in Equation 7 over this subspace of four histories, implying that there are
now strategies that are effectively identical (i.e. they have the same response for these four
histories, even though they differ in their response for one or more of the remaining four
histories 000, 010, 101, 111 which are not visited). More generally, such sub-cycles within
the de Bruijn graph may lead to a bias towards 1’s or 0’s in the global outcome sequence.
We note that such a biased series of outcomes can also be generated by biasing the initial
strategy pool.
We will focus now on the fluctuations of D[t] about its average value. The variance of
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D[t], which is the square of the standard deviation, is given by
σ2Ψ =
〈
D [S[t], µ[t]]2
〉
t
− 〈D [S[t], µ[t]]〉2t . (8)
For simplicity, we will assume the game output is unbiased and hence we can set
〈D [S[t], µ[t]]〉t = 0. As mentioned above, this might arise in a given system for a given
Ψ, or after additional averaging over all possible configurations {Ψ}. We stress that this ap-
proximation does not have to be made – one can simply continue subtracting 〈D [S[t], µ[t]]〉2t
from the right hand side of the expression for σ2Ψ. Hence
σ2Ψ =
〈
D [S[t], µ[t]]2
〉
t
(9)
=
2P∑
R,R′=1
〈
a
µ[t]
R n
S[t]
R a
µ[t]
R′ n
S[t]
R′
〉
t
.
In the case that the system visits all possible histories equally, the double sum can usefully be
broken down into three parts, based on the correlations between the strategies: aR.aR′ = P
(fully correlated), aR.aR′ = −P (fully anti-correlated), and aR.aR′ = 0 (fully uncorrelated)
where aR is a vector of dimension P with R’th component a
µ[t]
R . This decomposition is exact
in the RSS in which we are working. Again we note that if all histories are not equally visited,
yet some subset are, then this averaging can be carried out over the restricted subspace of
histories. The equal-histories case yields
σ2Ψ =
2P∑
R=1
〈(
a
µ[t]
R
)2 (
n
S[t]
R
)2〉
t
+
2P∑
R=1
〈
a
µ[t]
R a
µ[t]
R
n
S[t]
R n
S[t]
R
〉
t
+
2P∑
R6=R′ 6=R
〈
a
µ[t]
R a
µ[t]
R′ n
S[t]
R n
S[t]
R′
〉
t
=
2P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2 − nS[t]R nS[t]R
〉
t
+
2P∑
R6=R′ 6=R
〈
a
µ[t]
R a
µ[t]
R′
〉
t
〈
n
S[t]
R n
S[t]
R′
〉
t
(10)
=
2P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2 − nS[t]R nS[t]R
〉
t
+
2P∑
R6=R′ 6=R

 1
P
P−1∑
µ=0
a
µ[t]
R a
µ[t]
R′

〈nS[t]R nS[t]R′ 〉t
=
2P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2 − nS[t]R nS[t]R
〉
t
.
This sum over 2P terms can be written equivalently as a sum over P terms,
σ2Ψ =
2P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2 − nS[t]R nS[t]R
〉
t
(11)
=
P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2 − nS[t]R nS[t]R +
(
n
S[t]
R
)2 − nS[t]
R
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
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=
P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2 − 2nS[t]R nS[t]R +
(
n
S[t]
R
)2〉
t
=
P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R − nS[t]R
)2〉
t
≡
〈
P∑
R=1
(
n
S[t]
R − nS[t]R
)2〉
t
.
The values of n
S[t]
R and n
S[t]
R
for each R will depend on the precise form of Ψ. We now proceed
to consider the ensemble-average over all possible realizations of the strategy allocation
matrix Ψ. The ensemble-average is denoted as 〈...〉Ψ, and for simplicity the notation 〈σ2Ψ〉Ψ =
σ2 is defined. This ensemble-average is performed on either side of Equation 11,
σ2 =
〈〈
P∑
R=1
(
n
S[t]
R − nS[t]R
)2〉
t
〉
Ψ
(12)
yielding the variance in the excess demand D[t]. Equation 12 is an important intermediary
result for the Crowd-Anticrowd theory. It is straightforward to obtain analogous expressions
for the variances in n+1[t] and n−1[t].
A. Quantitative theory
Equation 12 provides us with an expression for the time-averaged fluctuations. Some
form of approximation must be introduced in order to reduce Equation 12 to explicit ana-
lytic expressions. It turns out that Equation 12 can be manipulated in a variety of ways,
depending on the level of approximation that one is prepared to make. The precise form of
any resulting analytic expression will depend on the details of the approximations made.
We now turn to the problem of evaluating Equation 12 analytically. A key first step
is to relabel the strategies. Specifically, the sum in Equation 12 is re-written to be over a
virtual-point ranking K and not the decimal form R. Consider the variation in points for a
given strategy, as a function of time for a given realization of Ψ. The ranking (i.e. label)
of a given strategy in terms of virtual-points score will typically change in time since the
individual strategies have a variation in virtual-points which also varies in time. For the
Minority Game, this variation is quite rapid in the low m regime since there are many more
agents than available strategies – hence any strategy emerging as the instantaneously highest-
scoring, will immediately get played by many agents and therefore be likely to lose on the
next time-step. More general games involving competition within a multi-agent population,
will typically generate a similar ecology of strategy-scores with no all-time winner. [N.B. If
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this weren’t the case, then there would by definition be an absolute best, second-best etc.
strategy. Hence any agent observing the game from the outside would be able to choose
such a strategy and win consistently. Such a system is not sufficiently competitive, and
is hence not the type of system we have in mind]. This implies that the specific identity
of the ‘K’th highest-scoring strategy’ changes frequently in time. It also implies that n
S[t]
R
varies considerably in time. Therefore in order to proceed, we shift the focus onto the time-
evolution of the highest-scoring strategy, second highest-scoring strategy etc. This should
have a much smoother time-evolution than the time-evolution for a given strategy. In short,
the focus is shifted from the time-evolution of the virtual points of a given strategy (i.e.
from SR[t]) to the time-evolution of the virtual points of the K’th highest scoring strategy
(i.e. to SK [t]).
Figure 5 shows a schematic representation of how the scores of the two top scoring
strategies might vary, using the new virtual-point ranking scheme. Also shown are the
lowest-scoring two strategies, which at every timestep are obviously just the anticorrelated
partners of the instantaneously highest-scoring two strategies. In the case that the strategies
all start off with zero points, these anticorrelated strategies appear as the mirror-image, i.e.
SK [t] = −SK [t]. The label K is used to denote the rank in terms of strategy score, i.e.
K = 1 is the highest scoring strategy position, K = 2 is the second highest-scoring strategy
position etc. with
SK=1 > SK=2 > SK=3 > SK=4 > ... (13)
assuming no strategy-ties. (Whenever strategy ties occur, this ranking gains a ‘degeneracy’
in that SK = SK+1 for a given K). A given strategy, e.g. −1 − 1 − 1 − 1, may at a
given timestep have label K = 1, while a few timesteps later have label K = 5. Given
that SR = −SR (i.e. all strategy scores start off at zero), then we know that SK = −SK .
Equation 12 can hence be rewritten exactly as
σ2 =
〈〈
P∑
K=1
(
n
S[t]
K − nS[t]K
)2〉
t
〉
Ψ
. (14)
Now we make another important observation. Since in the systems of interest the agents are
typically playing their highest-scoring strategies, then the relevant quantity in determining
how many agents will instantanously play a given strategy, is a knowledge of its relative
ranking – not the actual value of its virtual points score. This suggests that the quantities
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n
S[t]
K and n
S[t]
K
will fluctuate relatively little in time, and that we should now develop the
problem in terms of time-averaged values.
The actual number of agents n
S[t]
K playing the K’th ranked strategy at timestep t, can
be determined from knowledge of the strategy allocation matrix Ψ and the strategy scores
S[t], in order to calculate how many agents hold the K’th ranked strategy but do not hold
another strategy with higher-ranking. The heterogeneity in the population represented by Ψ,
combined with the strategy scores S[t], determines n
S[t]
K for each K and hence the standard
deviation in D[t]. We can rewrite the number of agents playing the strategy in position K
at any timestep t, in terms of some constant value nK plus a fluctuating term :
n
S[t]
K = nK + εK [t] . (15)
Consider a given timestep t in the game’s evolution. Some strategies may be tied in virtual-
points (i.e. they are ‘degenerate’) while others are not (i.e. ‘non-degenerate’). Depending
on the rules of the game, such degeneracy may imply one of the following: (i) an agent
must throw a coin to break a tie between any two degenerate strategies in his possession. In
this case, any two agents holding the same pair of degenerate strategies may then disagree
as to the ranking of the two strategies following the tie-break coin toss. (ii) The Game-
master must throw a master coin in order to produce a non-degenerate ranking. In this
case, all agents will then agree on a unique virtual-point ranking of strategies. (iii) An
agent must preserve the ranking from the most recent timestep at which the two strategies
weren’t degenerate. Depending on the exact microscopic rule adopted, the global dynamics
may differ. We will generally assume that rule (i) holds, since rule (ii) might introduce
large random fluctuations while rule (iii) could favor deterministic cyclic behavior. Suppose
that an agent holds two strategies R and R′, and that they are non-degenerate at timestep
t. Suppose that they occupy ranks K and K + 1 respectively. Let the number of agents
playing strategy R, the K’th ranked strategy, be nK at timestep t. Similarly the number
of agents playing strategy R′, the (K + 1)’th ranked strategy, is nK+1 at timestep t. Hence
εK [t] = 0 and εK+1[t] = 0 for this timestep, and indeed for all subsequent t until the next
strategy-tie. Suppose that the two strategies R and R′ now become degenerate at timestep
t + 1. In a game where each agent resolves strategy tie-breaks using a coin-toss, then both
R and R′ have probability 1/2 of being assigned the rank K at this timestep. This means
that any agent holding strategies R and R′, will play R or R′ with probability 1/2. Hence
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such degeneracy acts to add disorder into the number of agents playing the K’th highest-
scoring strategy. In particular, such coin-tosses at a given timestep t′ will tend to reduce
the number of agents playing higher-scoring strategies at that timestep (i.e. εK [t
′] < 0
for small K) but will increase the number of agents playing lower-scoring strategies (i.e.
εK [t
′] > 0 for large K). Therefore if we were to completely ignore coin-tosses, we would tend
to overestimate the number of people playing strategies which are higher-ranking (i.e. small
K) and underestimate the number playing strategies which are lower-ranking (i.e. large
K). This means that we will overestimate the size of Crowds, and underestimate the size
of Anticrowds. Hence we will overestimate the value of the standard deviation of demand.
[For this reason, the analytic expression σdelta f that we will derive, slightly overestimates
the actual value, and hence can be regarded as an approximate upper-bound as shown later
in Figure 7]. Accounting for the correct fraction of degenerate vs. non-degenerate timesteps,
will yield a more accurate calculation of the time-average 〈. . .〉t in Equation 14. We will
adopt this latter approach elsewhere for the network B-A-R system [44], thereby obtaining
accurate analytic expressions which are in excellent quantitative agreement with numerical
simulations.
Since our focus in this paper is more general, let us for the moment assume that we can
choose a suitable constant nK such that the fluctuation εK [t] represents a small noise term.
Hence,
σ2 =
〈
P∑
K=1
〈
[nK + εK [t]− nK − εK [t]]2
〉
t
〉
Ψ
(16)
=
〈
P∑
K=1
〈
[(nK − nK) + (εK [t]− εK [t])]2
〉
t
〉
Ψ
=
〈
P∑
K=1
〈
[nK − nK ]2 + [εK [t]− εK [t]]2 + [2(nK − nK)(εK[t]− εK [t])]
〉
t
〉
Ψ
≈
〈
P∑
K=1
〈
[nK − nK ]2
〉
t
〉
Ψ
=
〈
P∑
K=1
[nK − nK ]2
〉
Ψ
,
since the latter two terms involving noise will average out to be small. The resulting ex-
pression in Equation 16 involves no time dependence. The averaging over Ψ can then be
taken inside the sum. The individual terms in the sum, i.e.
〈
[nK − nK ]2
〉
Ψ
, are just an
expectation value of a function of two variables nK and nK . Each term can therefore be
rewritten exactly using the joint probability distribution for nK and nK , which we shall call
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P (nK , nK). Hence
σ2 =
P∑
K=1
〈
[nK − nK ]2
〉
Ψ
(17)
=
P∑
K=1
N∑
nK=0
N∑
n
K
=0
[nK − nK ]2 P (nK , nK),
where the standard probability result involving functions of two variables has been used.
In the event that Equation 17 is a reasonable approximation for the system under study,
the question then arises as to how to evaluate it. In general, its value will depend on the
detailed form of the joint probability function P (nK , nK) which in turn will depend on the
ensemble of quenched disorders {Ψ} which are being averaged over. We start off by looking
at Equation 17 in the limiting case where the averaging over the quenched disorder matrix
is dominated by matrices Ψ which are nearly flat. This will be a good approximation in the
‘crowded’ limit of small m in which there are many more agents than available strategies,
since the standard deviation of an element in Ψ (i.e. the standard deviation in bin-size) is
then much smaller than the mean bin-size. [N.B. If Ω is approximately flat, then so is Ψ].
In this limiting case, there are several nice features:
• Given the ranking in terms of virtual-points, i.e. SK=1 > SK=2 > SK=3 > SK=4 > ...
which holds by definition of the labels {K} if we neglect tie-breaks, we will also have
nK=1 > nK=2 > nK=3 > nK=4 > ... (18)
Hence the rankings in terms of highest virtual-points and popularity are identical. By
contrast, the ordering in terms of the labels {R} would not be sequential, i.e. it is not
true that nR=1 > nR=2 > nR=3 > nR=4 > ....
• The strategy K, which is anticorrelated to strategy K, occupies position K = 2P +
1−K in this popularity-ranked list.
• The probability distribution P (nK , nK) will be sharply peaked around the nK and nK
values given by the mean values for a flat quenched-disorder matrix Ψ. We will label
these mean values as nK and nK .
The last point implies that P (nK, nK) = δnK ,nKδnK ,nK and so
σ2 =
P∑
K=1
[nK − nK ]2 . (19)
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We note that there is a very simple interpretation of Equation 19. It represents the sum of the
variances for each Crowd-Anticrowd pair. For a given strategy K there is an anticorrelated
strategy K. The nK agents using strategy K are doing the opposite of the nK agents
using strategy K irrespective of the history bit-string. Hence the effective group-size for
each Crowd-Anticrowd pair is neffK = nK − nK : this represents the net step-size d of the
Crowd-Anticrowd pair in a random-walk contribution to the total variance. Hence, the net
contribution by this Crowd-Anticrowd pair to the variance is given by
[σ2]KK = 4pqd
2 = 4.
1
2
.
1
2
[neffK ]
2 = [nK − nK ]2 (20)
where p = q = 1/2 for a random walk. Since all the strong correlations have been removed
(i.e. anti-correlations) it can therefore be assumed that the separate Crowd-Anticrowd
pairs execute random walks which are uncorrelated with respect to each other. [Recall
the properties of the RSS - all the remaining strategies are uncorrelated.] Hence the total
variance is given by the sum of the individual variances,
σ2 =
P∑
K=1
[σ2]KK =
P∑
K=1
[nK − nK ]2 , (21)
which corresponds exactly to Equation 19. If strategy-ties occur frequently, then one has
to be more careful about evaluating nK since its value may be affected by the tie-breaking
rule. We will show elsewhere that this becomes quite important in the case of very small
m in the presence of network connections - this is because very small m naturally leads
to crowding in strategy space and hence mean-reverting virtual scores for strategies. This
mean-reversion is amplified further by the presence of network connections which increases
the crowding, thereby increasing the chance of strategy ties.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF CROWD-ANTICROWD THEORY
In this section we will consider the application of the Crowd-Anticrowd theory in some
limiting cases. As suggested by the previous discussion, we will break the implementation
of the Crowd-Anticrowd theory down into two separate regimes: small m, corresponding
to many more agents than available strategies, and large m corresponding to the opposite
case. Hence these two regimes are defined by the ratio of the number of strategies to
agents being much less/greater than unity, and hence the strategy allocation matrix Ψ
being densely/sparsely filled.
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A. Flat quenched disorder matrix Ψ, small m
Each element of Ψ has a mean of N/(2P )S agents per ‘bin’. In the case of small m
and hence densely-filled Ψ, the fluctuations in the number of agents per bin will be small
compared to this mean value. For the case S = 2, the mean number of agents whose highest
scoring strategy is the strategy occupying position K at timestep t, will therefore be given
by summing the appropriate rows and columns of this quenched disorder matrix Ψ. Figure
6 provides a schematic representation of Ψ with m = 2, s = 2, in the RSS. If the matrix Ψ
is flat, then any re-ordering due to changes in the strategy ranking has no effect on the form
of the matrix. Therefore the number of agents playing the K’th highest-scoring strategy,
will always be proportional to the number of shaded bins at that K (see Fig. 6 for K = 3).
The shaded elements in Figure 6 therefore represent those agents who hold a strategy that
is ranked third highest in score, i.e. K = 3. In games where the agents use their highest
scoring strategy, any agent using the strategy in position K = 3 cannot have any strategy
with a higher position. Hence the agents using the strategy in position K = 3 must lie in
one of the shaded bins. Since it is assumed that the coverage of the bins is uniform, the
mean number of agents using the strategy in position K = 3 is given by
nK=3 = N.
1
(2P )2
∑
(shaded bins) (22)
= N.
1
64
.[(8− 3) + (8− 3) + 1]
=
11
64
N.
For more general m and s values this becomes
nK =
N
(2P )S
[S(2P −K)S−1 + S(S − 1)
2
(2P −K)S−2 + ... + 1] (23)
=
N
(2P )S
S−1∑
r=0
S!
(S − r)!r! [2P −K]
r
=
N
(2P )S
([2P −K + 1]S − [2P −K]S)
= N.

[1− (K − 1)
2P
]S
−
[
1− K
2P
]S ,
with P ≡ 2m. In the case where each agent holds two strategies, S = 2, nK can be simplified
to
nK = N.

[1− (K − 1)
2P
]2
−
[
1− K
2P
]2 = (2m+2 − 2K + 1)
22(m+1)
N . (24)
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Similarly for nK the simplification is as follows:
nK =
(2m+2 − 2K + 1)
22(m+1)
N =
(2K − 1)
22(m+1)
N, (25)
where the relation K = 2P −K + 1 ≡ 2m+1 −K + 1 has been used. It is emphasized that
these results depend on the assumption that the averages are dominated by the effects of
flat distributions of the quenched disorder matrix Ψ, and hence will only be quantitatively
valid for low m. Using Equations 24 and 25 in Equation 19 gives
σ2 =
P∑
K=1
[
(2m+2 − 2K + 1)
22(m+1)
N − (2K − 1)
22(m+1)
N
]2
(26)
=
N2
22(2m+1)
P∑
K=1
[2m+1 − 2K + 1]2
=
N2
3.2m
(1− 2−2(m+1)),
and hence
σdelta f =
N√
3.2m/2
(1− 2−2(m+1)) 12 , (27)
which is valid for small m. (The rationale behind the choice of superscript ‘delta f ’ will
become apparent shortly.) This derivation has assumed that there are no strategy ties –
more precisely, we have assumed that the game rules governing strategy ties do not upset the
identical forms of the rankings in terms of highest virtual points and popularity. As discussed
earlier, this tends to overestimate the size of the Crowds using high-ranking strategies, and
underestimate the size of the Anticrowds using low-ranking strategies. Hence the Crowd-
Anticrowd cancellation is underestimated, and consequently σdelta f will overestimate the
actual σ value. As we will see later in Figure 7, σdelta f does indeed act as an approximate
upper bound.
B. Non-flat quenched disorder matrix Ψ, small m
The appearance of a significant number of non-flat quenched disorder matrices Ψ in the
ensemble, implies that the standard deviation for each ‘bin’ is now significant, i.e. non-
negligible compared to the mean. This will be increasingly true as m increases. In this case,
the general analysis is much more complicated, and should really appeal to the dynamics.
However, an approximate theory can still be developed. The features for the case of ensem-
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bles containing a significant number of non-flat quenched disorder matrices Ψ become as
follows:
• By definition of the labels {K}, the ranking in terms of virtual-points is retained, i.e.
SK=1 >SK=2 >SK=3 >SK=4 > ... is still always true in the absence of strategy ties.
However the disorder in the matrix Ψ may distort the number of agents playing a
given strategy to such an extent, that it is no longer true that nK=1 > nK=2 > nK=3 >
nK=4 > .... Hence the rankings in terms of highest virtual-points and popularity are
no longer identical. Another way of saying this is that the disorder in Ψ has introduced
a disorder into the popularity ranking, such that it now differs from the virtual-point
ranking. [We note that this disordering effect in the popularity ranking arising from
the non-flat Ψ, occurs in addition to the disordering effect due to coin-toss tie-breaking
of strategy degeneracies discussed earlier].
• In general we now have that nK ′ > nK ′′ > nK ′′′ > nK ′′′′ > ..., where the label K ′ need
not equal 1, and K ′′ need not equal 2 etc.. It is however possible to introduce a new
label {Q} which will rank the strategies in terms of popularity, i.e.
nQ=1 > nQ=2 > nQ=3 > nQ=4 > ..., (28)
where Q = 1 represents K ′, Q = 2 represents K ′′, etc.
With this in mind, we will return to the original general form for the standard deviation of
the excess demand in Equation 17, but rewrite it slightly as follows:
σ2 =
P∑
K=1
N∑
nK=0
N∑
n
K
=0
[nK − nK ]2 P (nK , nK) (29)
=
1
2
2P∑
K=1
N∑
nK=0
N∑
n
K
=0
[nK − nK ]2 P (nK , nK)
=
1
2
2P∑
K=1
2P∑
K ′=1


N∑
nK=0
N∑
nK′=0
[nK − nK ′]2 P (nK , nK ′)

 fK ′,K ,
where fK ′,K is the probability that K
′ is the anticorrelated strategy to K (i.e. K) and is
hence given by fK ′,K = δK ′,2P+1−K . This manipulation is exact so far.
A switch is now made to the popularity-labels {Q}. After relabelling, we obtain:
σ2 =
1
2
2P∑
Q=1
2P∑
Q′=1


N∑
nQ=0
N∑
nQ′=0
[nQ − nQ′]2 P (nQ, nQ′)

 fQ′,Q, (30)
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where fQ′,Q is the probability that the strategy with label Q
′ is anticorrelated to Q. Consider
any particular strategy which was labelled previously by K and is now labelled by Q. Unlike
the case of the flat disorder matrix, it is not guaranteed that this strategy’s anticorrelated
partner will lie in position Q′ = 2P + 1 − Q. All that can be said is that the strategy
R has changed label from K → Q(K) while the anticorrelated strategy has changed label
from K → Q(K) and that in general Q 6= 2P + 1 − Q. As stated earlier, we have as a
result of the relabelling that nQ=1 > nQ=2 > nQ=3 > nQ=4 > .... It can be assumed that
as a zeroth-order approximation the values of nQ=1, nQ=2, nQ=3,... etc. are still sharply
peaked around their mean values obtained for the flat-matrix case, i.e. it is assumed that
the probability distribution P (nQ(K), nQ′(K)) will be sharply peaked around the nQ(K) and
nQ′(K) values given by the mean values for a flat matrix. As before, we will label these
values nQ and nQ′ where the intrinsic dependence of Q on K has been dropped. Hence
P (nQ, nQ′) = δnQ,nQδnQ′ ,nQ′ with nQ and nQ′ given by the bin-counting method. Substituting
in P (nQ, nQ′) = δnQ,nQδnQ′ ,nQ′ gives
σ2 =
1
2
2P∑
Q=1
2P∑
Q′=1
[nQ − nQ′]2 fQ′Q, (31)
where the function fQ′,Q, which is the probability that the strategy with label Q
′ is anticor-
related to strategy Q, still needs to be specified.
So what should the form of fQ′,Q be? In the limit of negligible matrix disorder at small
m, as studied in the previous section, it will be a delta-function at Q′ = 2P + 1 − Q ≡ Q
since in this case the rankings in terms of popularity and virtual-points will once more be
identical. Hence we recover the results of the previous section. However, as the relative
importance of disorder in Ψ increases, the delta-function form will no longer be appropriate.
One approximate solution to this problem is to assume that the resulting disorder in the
popularity ranking (as compared to the original virtual-point ranking) is so strong, that
the probability that Q′ is anticorrelated to Q becomes independent of the label Q′ and is
hence given by 1/(2P ). Hence the anticorrelated strategy to Q could lie anywhere in the
strategy list {Q′} = 1, . . . 2P . In this sense, this is the opposite limit to the delta-function
case corresponding to the flat disorder matrix at small m. Hence instead of being a delta-
function at Q′ = 2P + 1−Q, it now follows that fQ′,Q has a ‘flat’ form given by 1/(2P ). In
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this limiting case we have
σflat f =
N√
3.2(m+1)/2
(1− 2−2(m+1)) 12 . (32)
Comparing this with Equation 27 it can be seen that
σflat f =
1√
2
σdelta f ≈ 0.7σdelta f (33)
for the case of S = 2. The superscripts ‘flat f ’ and ‘delta f ’ used in the previous section,
therefore can be seen to refer to the form of the probability function fQ′,Q. We emphasize
that Equation 27 can be derived from Equation 31 by letting fQ′,Q take the delta-function
form δQ′,2P+1−Q peaked at Q
′ = 2P + 1−Q ≡ Q.
C. Non-flat quenched disorder matrix Ψ, large m
For larger m, the standard deviation in the number of agents in a given bin is now similar
to the mean value. (By large m it is meant that the number of strategies is greater than N.s,
i.e. 2.2m > N.s). Furthermore, there tend to be either 0 or 1 agents in each box (Q,Q′). In
this limit, there will tend to be O(N) crowds, with each crowd having O(1) agent. Hence the
popularity ordering is highly degenerate since nQ = 0, 1 for all Q. Since the anticorrelated
strategy to Q could be anywhere, we have fQ′,Q = 1/(2P ). Using Equation 31 then gives
σ2 =
1
2
2P∑
Q=1
2P∑
Q′=1
[nQ − nQ′]2 fQ′,Q (34)
=
N∑
Q=1
{
[(nQ = 1)− (nQ′ = 1)]2 N
2P
+ [(nQ = 1)− (nQ′ = 0)]2 2P −N
2P
}
,
where the sum is now performed over theN strategies with one agent subscribed. Simplifying
this expression gives
σflat f, high m =

 N∑
Q=1
[(nQ = 1)− (nQ′ = 0)]2 2P −N
2P


1
2
(35)
= (N.
2P −N
2P
)
1
2
=
√
N(1− N
2m+1
)
1
2 ,
where P ≡ 2m has been used. We note in passing that it is quite simple to obtain a
slightly more sophisticated approximation for fQ′,Q which incorporates the agents’ behavior
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in picking their most successful strategy. For general S, this then yields
σflat f, high m =
√
N(1− NS − 1
2m+1
)
1
2 . (36)
[N.B. This latter expressions gives an even better fit to the numerical results shown later in
Figure 7].
D. Reduced vs. Full Strategy Space
The general dynamics for a typical game are likely to be similar in character when played
in both the FSS and the RSS [11]. Hence the RSS-based Crowd-Anticrowd theory would
generally be expected to provide a valid description for games played in the FSS as well.
In addition to straightforward numerical demonstration for the particular game of interest,
there is a theoretical justification which goes as follows. For a game played in the FSS there
are 22
m
/2.2m distinct subsets of strategies. Each subset can be considered as a separate
RSS. Note that the strategies that belong to a given RSS are optimally spread out across
the corresponding FSS hypercube. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 16,m = 2 strategies
across the 4 dimensional hypercube. The positions of the strategies belonging to the RSS
are such that no two strategies have a Hamming separation less than 2m/2. The same can
be said for any other choice of RSS. Due to the nature of a RSS, and given similar strings of
past outcomes over which to score strategies, each strategy within the RSS attains a score
in an uncorrelated or anticorrelated manner to any other strategy in the subset. Any other
RSS within the FSS will score its strategies in a similar way, although slightly out of phase.
For example for m = 3, the first RSS to be considered could contain the strategy 00001111,
and the second RSS considered could contain the strategy 01001111. It is easy to see that
on 7 out of 8 occasions these two strategies would score in the same way. Hence it can be
seen that these two strategies from two separate RSS, will follow each other during a typical
run of an unbiased game. This argument extends across all strategies in all of the 22
m
/2.2m
distinct RSS’s within the FSS. Hence a game using the FSS behaves as if there are 2.2m
clusters of strategies and so is similar to a game played in the RSS. These clusters form the
Crowds and Anticrowds of the theory, and this clustering allows the use of just one RSS in
the theory.
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VI. CROWD-ANTICROWD THEORY APPLIED TO GENERALIZED MINOR-
ITY GAMES
In this section we show that the present Crowd-Anticrowd theory, even within its RSS
formulation, provides a quantitative theory for both the Minority Game and several variants.
There is currently no other analytic theory which can match the quantitative agreement of
the Crowd-Anticrowd theory over such a parameter range, and over such a range of game
variants. This justifies our belief that the Crowd-Anticrowd theory is an important milestone
in such multi-agent systems, and possibly even for Complex Systems in general. It is also
pleasing from the point of view of physics methodology, since the basic underlying philosophy
of accounting correctly for ‘inter-particle’ correlations is already known to be successful in
more conventional areas of many-body physics. This success in turn raises the intriguing
possibility that conventional many-body physics might itself be open to re-interpretation in
terms of an appropriate multi-particle ‘game’: we leave this for future work.
A. Basic Minority Game
Figure 7 shows the standard deviation σ of the excess demand D[t], obtained for the
particular case of the Minority Game. The analytic results were taken from Sections VA,
VB and VC. The results are shown as a function of agent memory size m. The spread
in numerical values from individual runs, for a given m, indicates the extent to which the
choice of Ψ alters the dynamics of the MG. The upper line for each S value at low m, is
Equation 27 showing σdelta f . The lower line for each S value at low m, is Equation 32
showing σflat f . The line at high m is Equation 35 showing σflat f, high m, and is independent
of S. Comparing the analytic curves with the numerical results, it can be seen that the
analytic expressions capture the essential physics (i.e. the strong correlations) driving the
fluctuations in the system.
B. Alloy Minority Game
Here we consider the Crowd-Anticrowd theory applied to a mixed population containing
agents of different memory-sizes (or equivalently, agents with differing opinions as to the
relative importance of previous outcomes) [25]. Since we are interested in the effects of
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crowding within this mixed-ability population, we will focus on small m. Consider a pop-
ulation containing some agents with memory m1, and some agents with memory m2 where
m1 < m2. For a pure population of agents with the same memory m1, there is information
left in the history time-series [20]. In the small m1 limit, however, this information is hidden
in bit-strings of length greater than m1 and hence is not accessible to these agents. However
it would in principle be accessible to agents with a larger memory m2.
In the mixed population or ‘alloy’, there are two sub-populations comprising Nm1 agents
with memory m1 and S1 strategies per agent, and Nm2 = N − Nm1 agents with memory
m2 and S2 strategies per agent. Let us focus on the variance σ
2 of demand D[t]. If each
population were pure, it would form Crowd-Anticrowd groups as discussed earlier in this
paper, and hence provide a variance given by the sum of the variances of these uncorrelated
groups. In the mixed population, we can assume as a first approximation that the individual
groups for different m are also uncorrelated. In short, the agents looking at patterns of
length m1, and the agents looking at patterns of length m2, act in an uncorrelated way with
respect to each other. Hence the variance in the total D[t] from both sub-populations, can
be obtained by adding separately the contributions to the variance from the m1 agents and
the m2 agents. Hence σ
2 = σ21+σ
2
2 , where σ1 (σ2) is the variance due to the m1 (m2) agents.
Defining the concentration of m1 agents as x = Nm1/N , gives σ
2
1 = C
2(m1, S1)x
2N2 and
σ22 = C
2(m2, S2)(1−x)2N2 where the expressions for C2(m1, S1) and C2(m2, S2) follow from
Equations 19 and 23:
C2(mi, Si) =
2mi∑
K=1
([
1− (K − 1)
2mi+1
]Si
−
[
1− K
2mi+1
]Si
(37)
−
[
1− (2
mi+1 −K)
2mi+1
]Si
+
[
1− 2
mi+1 + 1−K
2mi+1
]Si)2
Hence
σ = N [C2(m1, S1)x
2 + C2(m2, S2)(1− x)2]1/2 . (38)
It can be seen that Equation 38 will generally exhibit a minimum in σ at finite x, hence the
mixed population uses the limited global resource more efficiently than a pure population
of either (m1, S1) or (m2, S2) agents. This analytic result has been confirmed in numerical
simulations of a mixed population [25, 32].
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C. Thermal Minority Game
In the ‘Thermal Minority Game’ (TMG) [37], agents choose between their S strategies
using an exponential probability weighting. As pointed out by Marsili et al [17], such a
probabilistic strategy weighting has a long tradition in economics and encodes a particu-
lar behavioral model. The numerical simulations of Cavagna et al demonstrated that at
small m, where the MG σ is larger-than-random, the TMG σ could be pushed below the
random coin-toss limit just by altering this relative probability weighting, or equivalently
the ‘temperature’ T [37]. This reduction in σ for stochastic strategies seems fairly general:
for example, in Ref. [33] we had presented a modified MG in which agents with stochastic
strategies also generate a smaller-than-random σ. The common underlying phenomenon
in both cases is that stochastic strategy rules tend to reduce (increase) the typical size of
Crowds (Anticrowds), which in turn implies an increase in the cancellation between the
actions of the Crowds and Anticrowds. Hence σ gets reduced, and can even fall below the
random coin-toss limit [33, 37].
We will now show that the Crowd-Anticrowd theory provides a quantitative explanation
of the main result of Ref. [37], whereby a smaller-than-random σ is generated with increasing
‘temperature’ [26, 27] at small m. We therefore focus on small m, and assume a nearly flat
strategy allocation matrix Ψ. At any moment in the game, strategies can be ranked according
to their virtual points, K = 1, 2 . . . 2m+1 where K = 1 is the best strategy, K = 2 is second
best, etc. Consider any two strategies ranked K and K∗ within the list of 2m+1 strategies in
the RSS. As mentioned earlier, in the small m regime of interest the virtual-point strategy
ranking and popularity ranking for strategies are essentially the same. Consider S = 2 as
an example. Let p(K,K∗|K∗ ≥ K) be the probability that a given agent possesses K and
K∗, where K∗ ≥ K (i.e. K is the best, or equal best, among his S = 2 strategies). In
contrast, let p(K,K∗|K∗ ≤ K) be the probability that a given agent possesses K and K∗,
where K∗ ≤ K (i.e. K is the worst, or equal worst, among his S = 2 strategies). Let θ
be the probability that the agent uses the worst of his S = 2 strategies, while 1 − θ is the
probability that he uses the best. The probability that the agent plays K is then given by
pK =
2m+1∑
K∗=1
[ θ p(K,K∗|K∗ ≤ K) + (1− θ) p(K,K∗|K∗ ≥ K)] (39)
= θ p−(K) + 2
−2(m+1) θ + (1− θ) p+(K)
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where p+(K) =
∑
K∗ p(K,K
∗|K∗ ≥ K) is the probability that the agent has picked K and
that K is the agent’s best (or equal best) strategy; p−(K) =
∑
K∗ p(K,K
∗|K∗ < K) is the
probability that the agent has picked K and that K is the agent’s worst strategy. Using
Equation 23 it is straightforward to show that
p+(K) =
([
1− (K − 1)
2m+1
]2
−
[
1− K
2m+1
]2)
. (40)
Note that p+(K) + p−(K) = p(K) where
p(K) = 2−m(1− 2−(m+2)) (41)
is the probability that the agent holds strategy K after his S = 2 picks, with no condition
on whether it is best or worst. An expression for p−(K) follows from Equations 40 and 41.
The basic MG corresponds to the case θ = 0.
In the TMG, each agent is equipped at each timestep with his own (biased) coin char-
acterised by exponential probability weightings [37, 45]. An agent then flips this coin at
each timestep to decide which strategy to use [37]. To relate the present analysis to the
TMG in Ref. [37], 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1/2 is considered: θ = 0 corresponds to ‘temperature’ T = 0
while θ → 1/2 corresponds to T →∞ [45] with θ = 1/2[1− tanh(1/T )]. Consider the mean
number of agents playing strategy K, which is now given by
nK = NpK = N (1− 2θ) p+(K) +N θ p(K) + 2−2(m+1) N θ . (42)
Recall Equation 19
σθ =
[ P∑
K=1
[nK − nK ]2
] 1
2
(43)
The quantities nK and nK are now θ-dependent (see Equation 42). Realizing that only the
first term in Equation 42 is actually a function of K and hence substituting Equations 40,
41 and 42 for K and K into Equation 19 yields
σθ = |1− 2θ| σθ=0 (44)
where σθ=0 is the standard deviation when θ = 0, i.e. the standard deviation ofD[t] obtained
for the basic MG. Equation 44 explicitly shows that the standard deviation σθ decreases as
θ increases (recall 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1/2): in other words, the standard deviation decreases as agents
use their worst strategy with increasing probability. An increase in θ leads to a reduction in
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the size of the larger Crowds using high-scoring strategies, as well as an increase in the size of
the smaller Anticrowds using lower-scoring strategies, hence resulting in a more substantial
cancellation effect between the Crowd and the Anticrowd. As θ increases, σθ will eventually
drop below the random coin-toss result at θ = θc where
θc =
1
2
−
√
N
2
1
σθ=0
. (45)
We now switch to the popularity labels {Q} in order to examine σ in the two limits of
‘delta f ’, and ‘flat f ’. The delta-function distribution is δQ′,2m+1+1−Q which is peaked at
Q′ = 2m+1 + 1 − Q, while the flat distribution is given by 1/(2P ) = [2−(m+1)]. Employing
these approximate distributions once again, the resulting expressions for σθ are
σdelta fθ = (1− 2θ)
N√
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m
2
(
1− 2−2(m+1)
) 1
2
(46)
and
σflat fθ = (1− 2θ)
N√
3 2(m+1)/2
(
1− 2−2(m+1)
) 1
2
(47)
respectively. For the TMG, θ = (1/2)[1− tanh(1/T )] although we again emphasize that the
Crowd-Anticrowd theory is not limited to the case of ‘thermal’ strategy weightings.
Figure 8 shows a comparison between the theory of Equations 46, 47 and numerical
simulation for various runs, m = 2 and S = 2. The theory agrees well in the range θ = 0→
0.35 and, most importantly, provides a quantitative explanation for the transition in σ from
larger-than-random to smaller-than-random as θ (and hence T ) is increased. The numerical
data for different runs has a significant natural spread. Most of these data points do lie in
the region in between the two analytic curves, which act as approximate upper and lower-
bounds. Above θ = 0.35, the numerical data tend to flatten off while the present theory
predicts a decrease in σ as θ → 0.5. This is because the present theory averages out the
fluctuations in strategy-use at each time-step (Equation 42 only considers the mean number
of agents using a strategy of given rank). Consider θ = 0.5. For a particular configuration of
strategies picked at the start of the game, and at a particular moment in time, the number
of agents using each strategy is typically distributed around the mean value nK = N2
−(m+1)
given by Equation 42 for θ = 0.5. The resulting distribution describing the strategy-use is
therefore non-flat. It is these fluctuations about the mean values nK and nK which give rise
to a non-zero σ. The Crowd-Anticrowd theory can be extended to account for the effect
of these fluctuations in strategy-use for θ → 0.5 in the following way: All N agents are
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randomly assigned S = 2 strategies. To represent a turn in the game, each agent flips a
(fair) coin to decide which of the two strategies is the preferred one. Having generated a list
of the number of agents using each strategy, σ is then found in the usual way by cancelling
off crowds and anticrowds. A time-averaged value for σ is then obtained by averaging over
100 independent coin-flip outcomes for the given initial distribution of strategies among
agents Ψ. This procedure provides a semi-analytic calculation for the value of σ at θ = 0.5.
It is also possible to perform a fully analytic calculation of the average σθ in the θ → 0.5
limit: the initial random assignment of strategies can be modelled using a random-walk.
This yields an average value of [nK − nK ]2 (i.e. time-averaged over the fluctuations) given
by N2−m(1 − 2−(m+1)). Summing over all pairs of correlated-anticorrelated strategies, i.e.
all Crowd-Anticrowd pairs, yields a (configuration-average) standard deviation given by
σθ→0.5 =
√
N [1− 2−2(m+1)] 12 . (48)
The agreement for θ → 0.5 is good. Note that at finite m, the value of σθ→0.5 will always lie
below the random coin-toss limit
√
N , regardless of the value of N . Hence the theoretical
and numerical results agree, but neither is equal to the random coin-toss limit as θ → 0.5
(i.e. T → ∞). Interestingly, we can therefore conclude that the high-temperature limit
in this system does not strictly correspond to the random coin-toss limit, regardless of the
value of N .
D. Thermal Alloy Minority Game
A variation of the Thermal Minority Game is now considered in which a concentration q
of agents employ a probabilistic strategy selection at each turn of the game. In particular,
these agents play their worst strategy with probability θ, and hence play their best strategy
with probability (1− θ). These qN agents will be called ‘TMG agents’ because of the direct
connection with the Thermal Minority Game discussed above. The remaining (1−q)N agents
choose their best strategy with probability unity (i.e. θ = 0 as in the basic MG) hence they
will be called ‘MG agents’. Numerical simulations show that as the concentration q of TMG
agents increases, or the probability θ (i.e. T ) increases, the standard deviation σ decreases.
We will now give the analytic explanation of this in terms of Crowd-Anticrowds.
Recall from Equation 39, the probability that the agent plays the K’th highest scoring
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strategy is given by
pTMGK =
2m+1∑
K∗=1
[ θ p(K,K∗|K∗ ≤ K) + (1− θ) p(K,K∗|K∗ ≥ K)] (49)
= θ p−(K) + 2
−2(m+1) θ + (1− θ) p+(K)
Setting θ = 0 in Equation 39 gives the probability that an MG agent plays K
pMGK = p+(K) . (50)
The mean number of agents nK playing strategyK in the mixed-population game containing
a concentration q of TMG agents and (1− q) of MG agents is now considered. This is given
by
nK = q N p
TMG
K + (1− q) N pMGK (51)
= N (1− 2 q θ) p+(K) +N q θ p(K) + 2−2(m+1) N q θ .
Following the same analysis as in the previous section for the Thermal Minority Game, we
obtain
σ(q, θ) = [1− 2 q θ] {σ(q, θ)}qθ=0 (52)
where {σ(q, θ)}qθ=0 is just the standard deviation for the basic MG (i.e. q = 0 and/or
θ = 0). Equation 52 predicts that the effect on the standard deviation caused by a change
in population composition and/or ‘temperature’ can be described by a simple prefactor
[1−2qθ]. Provided that the basic MG is in the crowded regime as discussed earlier, Equation
52 holds for all N and m and hence any value of {σ(q, θ)}qθ=0. Hence a critical value qc can
be predicted for fixed θ, or θc for fixed q, at which σ(q, θ) crosses from worse-than-random
to better-than-random. For a given value of θ, it follows from Equation 52 that
qc(θ) =
1
2θ
−
√
N
2θ
1
{σ(q, θ)}qθ=0 . (53)
A similar expression follows for θc(q). Given that 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1/2, Equation 53 implies that
the run-averaged numerical volatility should lie above the random coin-toss value if q < q∗c
where
q∗c = 1−
√
N
1
{σ(q, θ)}qθ=0 , (54)
regardless of ‘temperature’ T . Since the N and m values considered are such that the basic
MG is in the worse-than-random regime, {σ(q, θ)}qθ=0 ≥
√
N and therefore 0 ≤ q∗c ≤ 1 as
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required. Similarly σ(q, θ) will remain above the random coin-toss value for all q if θ < θ∗c
where
θ∗c =
1
2
−
√
N
2
1
{σ(q, θ)}qθ=0 . (55)
VII. B-A-R SYSTEMS WITH AN UNDERLYING NETWORK STRUCTURE
We now extend the above analysis to the case of a network connection between agents.
In the first subsection, we consider the appropriate modification of the nK values. In the
second sub-section, we follow the spirit of the alloy game mentioned above, whereby we
consider the case of very few connections within the population in order to show that in
principle the standard deviation can actually decrease as network connections are added.
A. Modification of nK
The presence of a network allows for a sharing of information across that network. De-
pending on the rules of the game regarding information exchange, the connected agents
may decide to adopt the strategy prediction of agents to whom they are connected. The
Crowd-Anticrowd calculation can be generalized to incorporate such situations by forming
new expressions for nK . In particular, the bin-counting method to give nK must now be
generalized to account for (i) any agent whose own strategies are lower ranking than K, but
who is connected to another agent holding strategy K, and (ii) any agent whose highest-
scoring strategy isK, but who has a connection to another agent with an even higher-scoring
strategy. The contribution (i) will increase nK above the bin-counting value, however contri-
bution (ii) then reduces it. The competition between these two effects will determine what
then happens to the standard deviation in the presence of connections.
We will consider the following rule governing functionality of connections. Consider agent
i connected to agent j in a game where each agent holds S strategies (e.g. S = 2). We also
suppose for the moment, that the ranking of strategies is unique (i.e. there are no strategies
which are tied in virtual-points). Suppose that the highest-ranking strategy of agent i is G,
but that the highest-ranking strategy of agent j is K where K < G and hence K has higher
virtual-point score than G. For the particular connection rule we have in mind, we will let
agent i therefore have access to the highest-scoring strategy of agent j. In other words,
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agent i now uses strategy K since it is the highest-scoring of the 2S strategies that the two
agents hold between them. Of course, agent i may also be connected to other agents – he
will therefore use the highest-scoring strategy among all the agents to whom he is connected.
In the case that agent j holds the highest-scoring strategy of them all, then agent i uses
the strategy ranked K. The same is true for all other agents. Hence we need to modify the
calculation of nK in order to incorporate this effect. In particular, the number of agents
using the K’th ranked strategy at a particular timestep in the game-with-network will be
nK
net = nK + n→K − nK→ (56)
where n→K is a sum over all agents who are connected to an agent whose highest-ranking
strategy is K, and who themselves have a highest-ranked strategy G which is worse than K
(i.e. G is lower-ranked than K and hence G > K). Hence these agents use K, whereas in
the absence of the network they would have used their own strategy which is lower-ranked
than K. By contrast, nK→ is a sum over all agents whose highest-ranking strategy is K,
but who are connected to an agent whose highest-ranked strategy G is better than K (i.e.
G is higher-ranked than K and hence G < K). Hence these agents use G, whereas in the
absence of the network they would have used K. Notice that this is irrespective of the actual
structure of the network, for example the network could be random, small-world, scale-free,
or regular.
In order to implement the renormalization of nK in a particular example, we consider the
case of a random network in which agent i has a probability of p of forming a connection
with agent j. The term n→K is given by summing over all agents whose own highest-scoring
strategy J is lower-ranked than K (i.e. J > K) given that they hold at least one connection
to an agent whose highest-scoring strategy is K but they don’t have any connections to any
agents with a higher-ranked strategy G (i.e. G < K). The resulting expression is
n→K =
[ ∑
J>K
nJ
][
(1− p)
∑
G<K
nG
] [
1− (1− p)nK
]
(57)
where the third factor represents the probability that a given agent holds at least one
connection to an agent whose highest-scoring strategy is K, the second factor accounts
for the probability that a given agent is not connected to any agent whose highest-scoring
strategy G is higher-ranked than K, and the first factor sums over all agents whose highest-
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scoring strategy J is lower-ranked than K. Continuing this analysis, we have
nK→ = nK
[
1− (1− p)
∑
G<K
nG
]
(58)
where the second factor accounts for the probability that a given agent has at least one
connection to an agent whose highest-scoring strategy G is higher-ranked than K, and the
first factor is just the number of agents whose own highest-scoring strategy is K. Finally, we
need a suitable expression nK , which is the number of agents using the K’th highest-ranking
strategy in the absence of the network. As before, we will consider the case of the small-m
limit with a flat strategy allocation matrix which, from Equation 23, gives
nK = N


[
1− (K − 1)
2m+1
]S
−
[
1− K
2m+1
]S . (59)
These expressions can then be used to evaluate σ. Elsewhere we will discuss the numeri-
cal results for a network B-A-R system [44]. In the limit of high connectivity p, there is
substantial crowding in the network B-A-R system and hence degeneracy of strategy scores.
Accounting for the correct frequency of degenerate/non-degenerate timesteps yields excellent
quantitative agreement with the numerical simulations [44].
B. Proof-in-principle that standard deviation can show a minimum at finite net-
work connectivity
Here we will present a proof-in-principle that the addition of connections can lead to a
reduction in the standard deviation σ of demand D[t]. In fact there are two competing effects
once more. First, connections will tend to increase the size of crowds since more agents are
now likely to play the better-performing strategies. On the other hand, any particular agent
who is connected to another, will effectively have up to 2S strategies at his disposal, thereby
increasing his chances of uncovering a ‘good’ strategy. It is this competition which interests
us here.
We consider the interesting case in which the B-A-R system has very few connections.
This might correspond to a design problem in which initially there are no connections,
and where the agents themselves are already designed and built. Hence possible control of
the system is limited to introducing communication links between the agents. It is likely
that such links will ‘cost’ the designer something, hence a cost-benefit question arises as
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to the extent to which the system can be further modified or controlled by introducing a
few connections into the system. In particular, how many links should be added, and how
should they be introduced? Here we will focus on a simpler version of this problem: we
assume that the links are expensive to introduce and cannot be formed in a selective way.
Hence we are assuming that there are very few links, and that the links that do exist have
been added in randomly to the system. The question we will address is then the subsequent
effect on the standard deviation of demand D[t] in the system.
Suppose there is a given probability p that any given agent i is connected to agent j.
The population of agents therefore will contain, in general, a certain number x1(p) of agents
who are unconnected (i.e. cluster-size n = 1), a number x2(p) of pairs of connected agents
(i.e. cluster-size n = 2), a number x3(p) of triples of connected agents (i.e. cluster-size
n = 3), etc. Hence we can effectively think of the population of N agents as comprising a
‘gas’ containing x1(p) monomers, x2(p) dimers, x3(p) trimers, and hence xn(p) n-mers where
n = 1, 2, 3 . . .. Hence we can write
N =
N∑
n=1
nxn(p) (60)
For very low network connection probability, any particular realization of the connections
will result in most agents remaining unconnected while a few are connected in pairs. Fig-
ure 9 shows a schematic diagram of this situation, whereby the population just comprises
monomers (i.e. isolated agents) and dimers (i.e. connected pairs of agents). This implies
that
N = x1(p) + 2x2(p) + . . . ≈ x1(p) + 2x2(p) (61)
The mean number of dimers is simply given by the total number of possible pairs, i.e.
1
2
N(N − 1), multiplied by the probability p that a given pair is connected, hence yielding
x2(p) =
1
2
pN(N −1). Hence x1(p) = N −2.12pN(N −1) = N −pN(N −1). We note that we
are implicitly working below the percolation threshold: when p ∼ 1/N we have that every
agent has on average one connection, in which case the assumption of truncating at dimers
breaks down. We now turn to the calculation of the variance of D[t]. Recall that in the
small m limit with flat matrices, the variance is given by
σ2 =
2m∑
K=1
[nK − nK ]2 . (62)
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For the case of no network (i.e. p = 0), this becomes σ2p=0(m,S) = C
2(m,S)N2 where we
have added in the explicit dependence on m and S, and have used the function defined
earlier on in Section VIB
C2(m,Si) =
2m∑
K=1
([
1− (K − 1)
2m+1
]Si
−
[
1− K
2m+1
]Si
(63)
−
[
1− (2
m+1 −K)
2m+1
]Si
+
[
1− 2
m+1 + 1−K
2m+1
]Si)2
.
Since the dimers are effectively ‘super-agents’ with 2S strategies at their disposal, as opposed
to the isolated monomer agents who only have S, it is reasonable to suppose that the
two populations (i.e. monomers and dimers) are uncorrelated on average. This is similar
in spirit to the approximation used for the case of the alloy of mixed-memory agents in
Section VI. Hence the contribution to D[t] by the monomer agents forms a stochastic process
which is uncorrelated to the contribution from the gas of dimer agents. Note that we are
not assuming that the individual monomers are not correlated with each other, or that
the individual dimers are not correlated with each other – on the contrary, there will be
significant crowding (i.e. correlations) within each sub-population. The variance of D[t] for
the combined population, can hence be written as follows
σ2p =
N∑
n=1
σ2n;p = σ
2
1;p + σ
2
2;p + . . . (64)
The partial contributions are given as follows:
σ21;p = [x1(p)]
2C2(m,S) = [1− p(N − 1)]2N2C2(m,S) (65)
and
σ22;p = 2
2[x2(p)]
2C2(m, 2S) = [p(N − 1)]2N2C2(m, 2S) (66)
where the factor 22 reflects the fact that the dimer acts with step-size 2 as opposed to 1 for
the monomers. Hence we obtain
σ2p = [1− p(N − 1)]2σ2p=0(m,S) + [p(N − 1)]2σ2p=0(m, 2S) . (67)
This expression can then be minimized with respect to p, yielding a minimum in σ2p at
pmin =
[
(N − 1)
[
1 +
σ2p=0(m, 2S)
σ2p=0(m,S)
]]−1
. (68)
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Since σ2p=0(m, 2S) is larger than σ
2
p=0(m,S) for small m, we have that pmin < [N − 1]−1.
Hence we have proved that, to the extent to which a particular numerical implementation
reflects the connection rules assumed in the present analysis, adding in a small number of
connections can actually reduce the fluctuations in D[t] and hence improve perfomance, in
the sense that the fluctuations in excess demand D[t] are reduced. Interestingly, such a
minimum in σ has already been reported based on numerical simulations for a somewhat
similar game [46]. Our expression for pmin is likely to underestimate the actual p value
at which a minimum occurs, since we have overestimated the coordination within a given
dimer, in addition to overestimating the number of dimers (and hence underestimating the
effects of trimers etc.). However the fact that the Crowd-Anticrowd analysis predicts that
a minimum can in principle exist, and Ref. [46] had earlier found a minimum numerically
in a similar game, is very encouraging. Clearly there is a vast amount of further theoretical
analysis that can be done within the present framework – however we leave this to future
presentations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have given an in-depth presentation of the Crowd-Anticrowd theory in order to under-
stand the fluctuations in competitive multi-agent systems, in particular those based on an
underlying binary structure. Since the theory incorporates details concerning the structure
of the strategy space, and its possible coupling to history space, we believe that the Crowd-
Anticrowd theory will have applicability for more general multi-agent systems. Hence we
believe that the Crowd-Anticrowd concept might serve as a fundamental theoretical concept
for more general Complex Systems which mimic competitive multi-agent games. This would
be a welcome development, given the lack of general theoretical concepts in the field of Com-
plex Systems as a whole. It is also pleasing from the point of view of physics methodology,
since the basic underlying philosophy of accounting correctly for ‘inter-particle’ correlations
is already known to be successful in more conventional areas of many-body physics. This
success in turn raises the intriguing possibility that conventional many-body physics might
be open to re-interpretation in terms of an appropriate multi-particle ‘game’: we leave this
for future work.
Some properties of multi-agent games cannot be described using time- and configuration-
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averaged theories. In particular, an observation of a real-world Complex System which is
thought to resemble a multi-agent game, may correspond to a single run which evolves from a
specific initial configuration of agents’ strategies. This implies a particular Ψ, and hence the
time-averagings within the Crowd-Anticrowd theory must be carried out for that particular
choice of Ψ. However this problem can still be cast in terms of the Crowd-Anticrowd
approach, since the averagings are then just carried out over some sub-set of paths in history
space, which is conditional on the path along which the Complex System is already heading.
We also emphasize that a single Ψ ‘macrostate’ corresponds to many possible ‘microstates’,
where each microstate corresponds to one particular partition of strategy allocation among
the agents. Hence the Crowd-Anticrowd theory retained at the level of a given specified
Ψ, is equally valid for the entire set of games which share this same ‘macrostate’. We
refer to David Smith’s presentation at this Workshop for a detailed discussion of Ψ-specific
dynamics. See also Refs. [29, 30] for the simpler case of the Minority Game.
We have been discussing a Complex System based on multi-agent dynamics, in which
both deterministic and stochastic processes co-exist, and are indeed intertwined. Depending
on the particular rules of the game, the stochastic element may be associated with any of five
areas: (i) disorder associated with the strategy allocation and hence with the heterogeneity
in the population, (ii) disorder in the underlying network. Both (i) and (ii) might typically
be fixed from the outset (i.e., quenched disorder) hence it is interesting to see the interplay
of (i) and (ii) in terms of the overall performance of the system. The extent to which
these two ‘hard-wired’ disorders might then compensate each other, as for example in the
Parrondo effect or stochastic resonance, is an interesting question. Such a compensation
effect might be engineered, for example, by altering the rules-of-the-game concerning inter-
agent communication on the existing network. Three further possible sources of stochasticity
are (iii) tie-breaks in the scores of strategies, (iv) a stochastic rule in order for each agent to
pick which strategy to use from the available S strategies, as in the Thermal Minority Game,
(v) stochasticity in the global resource level L[t] due to changing external conditions. To a
greater or lesser extent, these five stochastic elements will tend to break up any deterministic
cycles arising in the game. In the case of (iii), the stochasticity due to tie-breaks, we note
that this stochasticity may actually have a physical significance. Suppose a real agent is
at a deadlock in terms of which strategy to use at a particular timestep: some additional
microscopic factor may then become important in determining the particular strategy that
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the agent follows (e.g. power level in the case of mechanical agents) hence breaking the tie.
In this way, the coin-toss mimics the effect of this additional microscopic characteristic of
the individual agents, which had been left out of the original game.
The future therefore looks very interesting for these Binary Agent Resource models. By
moving beyond the confines of the El Farol Problem and Minority Games – for example
by introducing underlying network structures and generalized game rules – the possibility
exists for pursuing a general yet cohesive path through the Complex Systems landscape.
On the control and design aspect, the fascinating question now arises concerning the best
way to insert the Crowd-Anticrowd theory within the powerful COIN (Collective Intelli-
gence) framework developed by Wolpert and Tumer for Collectives[7]. This question will be
addressed in future works.
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FIGURES
FIGURE 1 Schematic representation of B-A-R (Binary Agent Resource) system. At
timestep t, each agent decides between action −1 and action +1 based on the predictions
of the S strategies that he possesses. A total of n−1[t] agents choose −1, and n+1[t] choose
+1. In the simplified case that each agent’s confidence threshold for entry into the game is
very small, then n−1[t] + n+1[t] = N (i.e. all agents play at every timestep). Agents may be
subject to some underlying network structure which may be static or evolving, and ordered
or disordered. The strategy allocation, and hence heterogeneity in the population, provides
a further source of disorder which may be static (i.e. quenched) or evolving. The algorithm
for deciding the global outcome, and hence which action was winning/losing, lies in the
hands of a ficticious ‘Game-master’. This Game-master aggregates the agents’ actions and
then announces the global outcome. All strategies are then rewarded/penalized according
to whether they had predicted the winning/losing action.
FIGURE 2 Strategy Space for m = 2, together with some example strategies (left). The
strategy space shown is known as the Full Strategy Space FSS, and contains all possible
permutations of the actions −1 and +1 for each history. There are 22m strategies in the
FSS. The 2m dimensional hypercube (right) shows all 22
m
strategies from the FSS at its
vertices. The shaded strategies form a Reduced Strategy Space RSS. There are 2.2m = 2m+1
strategies in the RSS. The red shaded line connects two strategies with a Hamming distance
separation of 4.
FIGURE 3 History Space. Examples of the de Bruijn graph for m = 1, 2, and 3. Red
transitions between states correspond to the most recent global outcome 0. Blue transitions
between states correspond to the most recent global outcome 1.
FIGURE 4 Example distribution for the tensor Ω describing the strategy allocation for
N = 101 agents in the case of m = 2 and S = 2, for the reduced strategy space RSS.
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FIGURE 5 Schematic diagram of a fairly typical variation in strategy scores, as a function
of time, for a competitive game. This behavior is particularly relevant for the low m regime
where there are many more agents than strategies, and hence strategy rankings change in
time due to being overplayed. The strategies at any given timestep can be ranked in terms of
virtual-point ranking K, with K = 1 as the highest-scoring and K = 1 as the lowest-scoring.
The actual identity of the strategy in rank K changes as time progresses, as can be seen.
Ignoring accidental ties in score, there is a well defined ranking of strategies at each timestep
in terms of their K values.
FIGURE 6 Schematic representation of the strategy allocation matrix Ψ with m = 2 and
s = 2, in the RSS. The strategies are ranked according to strategy score, and are labelled
by the rank K. In the limit that Ψ is essentially flat, then the number of agents playing the
K’th highest-scoring strategy, is just proportional to the number of shaded bins at that K.
FIGURE 7 Crowd-Anticrowd theory vs. numerical simulation results for Minority Game
as a function of memory size m, for N = 101 agents, at S = 2, 4 and 8. At each S
value, analytic forms of standard deviation in excess demand D[t], are shown corresponding
to σdelta f (upper solid line), σflat f (lower dashed line) and σflat f, high m (monotonically-
increasing solid line which is independent of S). The numerical values were obtained from
different simulation runs (triangles, crosses and circles).
FIGURE 8 Crowd-Anticrowd theory vs. numerical simulation results for Thermal Minority
Game as a function of stochastic probability θ, or ‘temperature’ T . The analytic results
(lines) correspond to the σdelta fθ (solid upper line) and σ
flat f
θ (solid lower line) limiting-case
approximations.
FIGURE 9 Schematic representation of B-A-R (Binary Agent Resource) network system
in limit of few connections.
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